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San Pedro, etc. Co., supra; Jones v. Walker,47 Cal. App. (2d)
566 [118 P. (2d) 299].)
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J.,
and Peters, J. pro tem., concurred.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied October
22,1942. Curtis, J~, and Carter, J., voted for a rehearing.

[L. A. No. 18334.

In Bank.

Sept. 24, 1942.]

WILLIAM R. PARKHURST, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENT COMMISSION et al., Respondents.

Sept. 1942]
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the Industrial Accident Commission on the question its award
will not be disturbed, though the rule is otherwise if there is
no evidence to support the finding.
[5a, 5b] Id. - Evidence - Sufficiency- Willful Misconduct.-An
Industrial Accident Commission's finding that the amoebic
dysentery contracted by an employee was not caused by the
serious and willful misconduct of the employer is not supported by the evidence where it appears that the employer in
knowing violation of the Common Drinking and Water Cooler
Protection Law furnished his employees with water by means
of an open bucket and a common dipper, and where, irrespective
of any charge of knowledge of the contamination of a reservoir from which water at times siphoned iato the line from
which the drinking water was drawn,the employer was
chargeable with knowledge of the danger incident to such
means of distribution. Evidence that no ill effects were suffered by previous users loses its pertinence in view of the
finding of numerous complaints as to the water.

[1] Workmen's Compensation - Compensable Injuries - Willful
Misconduct. - Serious and willful misconduct, within the
meaning of the workmen's compensation law, is conduct that
the employer knows or should know is likely to cause serious
injury, or conduct that evinces a reckless disregard for the
safety of others.
[2] Evidence-Presumptions-Knowledge of Law.-An employer
is charged with knowledge of the Common Drinking Cup and
Water Cooler Protection Law. (Stats. 1917, p. 1517, Deering's
Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 6259.)
[3] Workmen's Compensation - Compensable Injuries - Willful
Misconduct-Violation of Law. - A deliberate breach by an
employer of a law framed in the interests of the workingman
amoullts to serious and willful misconduct within the meaning of the workmen's compensation law.

[6] Id.-Compensable Injuries - Willful Misconduct - Mistaken
Judgment as Defense.-The fact that an employer does not
consider dangerous the distribution of drinking water by
open bucket and cornmon dipper does not relieve him from
liability for serious and willful misconduct in this respect.

[4] Id. - Certiorari -Findings - Miscond uct. - The question
whether the serious and willful misconduct of an employer
caused an employee's injury is essentially one of fact; and
if there is any substantial evidence to support the finding of

PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial A(',eident Commission denying additional compensation for personal injuries. Order annulled.

. [1] Serious and willful misconduct of employer, notes, 16
A. L. R. 620, 58 A.L. R. 1379. See, also, 27 Cal. J!lr. 44l.
[2] See 10 Cal. Jur. 760.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3, 6] Workmen's Compensation,
§ 124; [2] Evidence, § 133; [4J Workmen's Compensation,
§ 272(6); [5] Workmen's Compensation, § 180; [7J Master and
Servant, § 72.

[7] Master and Servant-Injuries to Employees-Delegation of
Employer's Duties.-A subcontractor employer cannot delegate its duty to furnish its employees with pure drinking
water in closed containers and individual drinking cups
(Stats. 1915, p. 815, Deering'S Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 4725;
Stats. 1917, p. 1517, Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 6259).
And it cannot avoid liability to an cmployee by claiming that
it customarily accepted the facilities furnished by the gnneral contractor und that the latter WUH undcr U contrndual
obligation to it with respect to such faeilitics.

William J. Currer, Jr., for Petitioner .
C. Wesley Davis, Everett A. Cortenand J. Gould for
Respondents.
T RAY NOR, J.-Respondent Industrial Accident Commission awarded the petitioner compensation for injuries
received in the course of his employment but denied an

828

.:

'

PAltKHURST v. INDUSTRIAL Ace. COM. '[20 C. (2d)

additional award claimed by reason of the alleged serious
and willful misconduct of the employer. The sole issue in
this proceeding is whether the commission's order that petitioner's injury was not caused by the serious and willful
misconduct of the employer finds support in the record.
Between June 9, 1938, and September 15, 1938, petitioner
was employed as a journeyman ironworker by the J. Phillip
Murphy Corporation, which was engaged as a subcontractor
in the installation of structural iron on a building project
at Camarillo, California. In the course of his employment
petitioner was exposed to entamoeba histolytica through the
drinking water furnished at the project, and contracted
amoebic ·dysentery. The medical testimony disclosed that the
disease is usually contracted by drinking contaminated water,
that water can be contaminated by contact with fecal matter
or contaminated hands, and that a single person who is a
carrier of the disease can infect the water supply and cause
an epidemic among persons drinking the water. The water
line at the project' was attached to
pipe connecting an
irrigation pump and a neighboring uncovered reservoir.
When a certain valve was opened to irrigate adjoining land,
water from the reservoir would siphon into. the water line
and outlets on the job. There was evidence that the reservoir was used as a swimmingpool.and that tests made by
the county health authorities on May 17, 1939, revealed that
the water, although still classified by them as good, was con~
taminated with fecal matter. The water was· drawn. from
faucets used by the men in washing their hands On their
way to and from the toilets, which were near some of the
faucets. It was supplied to the men by an open bucket and
common dipper, in violation of statutes requiring Closed containers and individual drinking cups. (Stats. 1917, p. 1517,
Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 6259; Stats. 1915, p. 815, Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 4725.) The employer, commencing work
as subcontractor after construction was under way, accepted
the facilities furnished by the general contractor. He knew
how the water was distributed, but D).ade no inquiry as to its
source. At no time did he attempt to furnish his employees
with' pure, fresh drinking water. Numerous men complained
at various times to the employer's superintendent and man~
aging representative that the drinking water had a foul taste
and odor, and gave them diarrhea and cramps. The superintendent acknowledged that the water was bad, but said in
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effect that no other was available. All water available from
wells in the district had a somewhat unpleasant taste and
odor; The uncontradicted testimony of the health authorities disclosed that they inspected the 'premises on August· 30,
1938, in response to complaints made to their office regarding the metho'd of distributing the water, and' ·that they
ordered the· contractor to desist from distributing water in
open containers and common dippers.
(,
Petitioner relies upon the violation of theSt~tutes ;and:
the complaints by the men tosttpp6rt· hiS 'contention' thllt'
the employer WaB guilty of serious and <'willful' n{isconduct.
He contends that there was no. evidence to supportithe'comniis'::'
sion'scontrary conclusion 'and attacks particuill.rly·the com~:'
mission's finding that "No officer or representatife of.)'; Phil~;
lip Murphy Corporation had anyknowledie, -eith~r actu:al
. <l.r constructive, that the drinking water or the facilities . for
d:istributing the drinking water furnished to its!einployees:
on this job, was capable of producing iml6ebid' dysentery,'
or was otherwise dangerous to the health of its employees. ":
The {lOmmission did find, however, that'I>etitioner was·injured
in, the course and scope of employment, and, awarded compensation accordingly.
" ..
[11S'erious and willful misconduct is .conduct that the
employer knew, or should have known, waS likely to cailse
serious injury, or conduct that evinces a reckless disregard
for the safety of others. (Hatlieway v. Industrial Ace. Oom.,
~3 Cal. (2d) 377 [90 P. (2d) 68]; EthelD.Oo. v, Industrial
Ace. Oom., 219 CaL 699 [28 P. (2d) 919]; Hoffman v. Dept;
of Indus. Relations, 209 Cal. 383[287 Pac. 974, 68 A.L. R.
294]; Pacific Emp. Ins. 00. v. Industrial Ace. Oom., ·209 Cal.
412 [288 Pac. 66] ; Gordon v. IndustriaZ Acc.Oom., 199 Cal.
420 [249 Pac. 849] ; Blue Diamond Plaster 00. v. Industrial
Ace. Oom., 188 Cal. 403 [205 Pac. 678] ; E. Olemens Horst
00. v. Industrial Ace. dom., 184 Cal. 180 [193 Pac, 105, 16
A. L. R. 611] ; Helmick v. Industrial Ace. Oom.,46 Cal. App.
(2d) 651[116 P. (2d) 658] ; Helme v. Great Western Milling
00;, 43 Cal. App. 416 [185 Pac. 510].) It has been heid repeatedly that the employment of workmen under dangerous conditions that can be guarded against constitutes a reckless
disregard for their safety. (Hatheway v. Industrial Ace.
Oom., supraj HojJ'TfI4n v. Dept. of Indus. Relations, supraj
Pacific Emp. Ins. 00. v. Industrial Ace. Oom., supraj Gordon v. IndustriaZ Ace. Oom., suprajBlue Diamond Plaster 00.

.'

.,'
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v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra; Johannsen v. Ind1.fstr.ial,A.cc.
Ii

Cp~.,,113 Cal. App. 162 [298 Pac. 99].) The. test unde~
these cqses is whether the employer knowingly or . willfully
committed an act that he knew or should have' known was·
likely to' cau~e harm: to his employee. In the present case,
the employer by knowingly violating its statutory duty to
supply its employees with pure drinking water in closed containers and individual cups, set the conditions ·for the transmission of various communicable diseases and exposed ita
e:rnployees to the hazard of serious injury therefrom.
It·is true that not every violation of a statute is serious
and willful misconduct.· (Hoffman v. Dept. of Indus. Relations, supra;. Helme v. Great Western Milling Co., supra. See,
also, Ethel D. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra (commission's safety order) ; Great. Western Power Co. v. Pillsbury,
170 Cal. 180 [149 Pac. 35] ; Simpson v. Industrial Acc. Com.,
87 Cal. App. 652 [262 Pac. 469] ; 22 Cal. L. Rev. 432.) In
Hoffman v. Dept. of Indus. Relations, 209 Cal. 383, 390 [287
Pac. 974, 68 A. ·L. R. 294], this. court stated: "It will be
conceded that the violation of one statute may be far more
serious, tllan the violation of another statute; and that the
violation of the' same statute under one set of facts may not
be' serious, whereas· under a different set of facts it will be
quite serious indeed." It has long been recognized that
communicable diseases are readily transmitted. by common,
drinking cups and the statutes in the present case were designed to safeguard employees against that hazard. Violation of these statutes is particularly serious when hundreds
of men are. employed on the same project at the same time
and do not have access to other drinking water. [2], The
employer is charged with knowledge of the statute (Hoffman
v. Dept. of Indus. Relations, supra. See, also, 10 Cal. Jur.
760) and was found by the commission to know that the
water was distributed in violation of the statutory require-,
ments. On these issues there was no conflict. Violation of the
stat.utes in question was not mere. negligence (See Hoffman
v. Dept. of Indus. Relations, supra; Helme v.. QreatWestern
Milling Co., supra;ln re Burns, 218 Mass. 8 [105N. E. 601,
Ann. Oas. 1916A, 787]), but criminal conduct punishable as a
misdemeanor. (Stats. 1917, p. 1517, Deering's Gen. Laws,
Act. 6259; Stats. 1915, p. 815, Deering's Gen. Laws, Act
4725). [3] .. " . . . Where there is a deliberate breach of a
law , ,~, which is framed in the interests of the wor~
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man, It will' be held that such a breach ...' . amounts toserlous misconduct. "So spoke thecou;rt in Fidelity ,e.tc. Co. v.
Industrial Acc. Com., 171 CaL 728 [154 .. Pac. 834,t.R. 4.
1916D, 903], animlling an award based on . a finding that
an employee whose injury resulted from a violation of speed
laws was not guilty of serious and willful misconduct. The
rule must be similarly applied to the c(rD.duct of an employer.
1t remains to determine whether th~re .'is' any eVidence in
the record from, which the commission could find, that th~~e
no serious and willful miscon4uc~ by the eDlplc;>yer d(;lspite theviolatioIi of the statutes. [41 It is well settlid that
the question whether serious ~nd willful miscond.uc~ of We
employer caused the employee~s injury is essenii~ly.ori.e"of
fact, and that if there is any sUbst.antial evidence' 't~ support the findings of the commission. its . award ,win' not' be
disturbed. Its award -Will be set asi"de, however, if there" i$
no evidence to support its findings. (HathewaYv. JndustriO-Z
Abc. Com., supra; Ethel D. Co. v. Industrial· Acc. aom~,
supra.) [5a] Respondent places great emphasis on evidenc~
in the record that the county health authorities . considered
the water safe for drinking. The employer seeks to' draw
an inference therefrom that it could not be charged' with
knowledge that the water was unfit for· human consumption. Actually, however, the opinion of the health authori~
ties referred only to the water in the reservoir nearly one
year after the injury. They made po tests of the water
hefore or at the time of the injury. Their examination did
not extend to water in the buckets and dippers; which they
, had previously ordered discontinued. Even If an inference
could be drawn that the employer was,not chargeabk with
kllowledge that the water in the reservoir was contaminated, it
was nonetheless chargeable with knowledge of the danger incidept to distribution by means of an open bucket and com:mon dipper. [6] While there was evidence that J.' Phillip
Murphy, president, general manager, and sole ,stockholder
of the employer corporation, had drunk the water from
the common dipper, the most favorable1inference that can
be drawn therefrom is that he did not consider the means
of distribUtion dangerous. It has been' held, . how~ver,
that an employer's mistake in judgment' does.not relieve him from liability for serious and willful mi~co~duct.
(Blue Di.amond Plaster Co. v. Industrial Acc.cCJom., -s~pra:)
The evidence that the drinking facilities were. installe<i' :b;i

was .'
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the general contractor and were used by its employees with
no ill effects will not support the commission's finding. 'l'he
commission's finding regarding the numerous complaints registered by the men destroys the pertinence of the alleged
effect of the water on previous users; [7] The testimony
of the employer that it customarily accepted the facilities
furnished by the general contractor and that the latter was
under a contractual obligation to it with respect to such facilities indicates a misconception of its duties and liabilities
with regard to the safety of its employees. 'l'he employer
was aware of the general contractor's breach of contract.
Its own statutory duty to furnish its employees with pure
drinking water in closed containers and in individual drinking cups could not be delegated. [5b] In the light of the
findings of the commission and in the absence or substantial
evidence to support its conclusion that the injury Was not
ca.used by the serious and willful misconduct of the employer, the order denying additional compensation is annulled.
Shenk, J., Curtis, J;, Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and Peters,
J. pro tem., concurred.
Gibson, C. J., did not. participate herein.
,in

[Crim. No. 4421.

In Bank.

Sept. 24,1942.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. MAUDE MAE' YOUNG,
Appellant.
[la,.lb] 'Homicide-Negligent Homicide-Construction ,of Statute.
-'-In the 1941 amendment to Veh. Code, § 500, which refers
to the crime of "negligent homicide," the term "negligent"
is not used in its ordinary sense. And the specific terms in
the code section describing the manner in whIch the vehicle
must be driven to constitute a crime should be interpreted in
accordance with the definitions given by courts to similar
terms if those definitions may reasonably be said to fit the
particular words used.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3-5] Homicide, § 25a; [2] Negligence, § 3; Torts, § 2.
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[2] Negligence - Definition and Nature: Torts - Definition and
Nature.-Ordinary negligence consists of acts or omissions
which are not compatible with the standard of care exercised
hy an abstract man of ordinary prudence. The test of such
negligence is an objective, rather than a subjective, one.
In case of the intentional tort, such as trespass and assault
and battery, the test of wrongdoing is subjective as the intent
of the wrongdoer is involved. As to conduct falling between
these classes, the terms "gross negligence" and "wilful misconduct" have been employed. '
[3a, 3b]Homicide-Negligent Homicide-Reckless Disregard of
Safety.-The phrase "reckless disregard .of the safety 6f
others," appearing in Yeh. Code, § 505, is equivaient to the
phrase the "intentional doing of an act with wanton and
reckless disregard of its possible results." There is no substantial difference between the words "wilful and wanton"
in the statutory definitIon of reckless driving (Yeh. Code,
§ 500) and "reckless" in § 500.
.
[4] ld.-Negligent Homicide-Indifference to Safety•..,...A wilful.
indifference to the safety of others, within the meaning of
Yeh. Code, § 500, is an intentional lack of regard concerning
the safety of others, or an intentional doing of something with
knowledge that serious injury is a probable r~sult.
.
[6] ld.-Negligent Homicide.-A motorist who killed a passenger
disembarking from a streetcar was not guilty of negligent
homicide within Yeh. Code, § 500, where it appeared merely
that she was guilty of negligence, as whtire it appeared that
she was overtaking and endeavoring to pass a street car
while eXlleeding the speed limit, but without traveling at a
particularly excessive speed (35 m. p. h;), that she failed to
stop at the rear of the car as required in the absence of a
safety zone, that she failed to observe that the. car was being
brought to a stop, and that she did not see the disembarking
passenger until he stepped from the car.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Diego County and from an order denying a new trial. Gordon Thompson, Judge. Judgment .reversed.
Prosecution for negligent homicide. Judgment of conviction reversed.
Newton F. Rozzelle, Jr., for Appellant.
Earl Warren, Attorney General, and Gilbert F. Nelson, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
[3] See 5 Am. Jur. 927.
20 C. (2d)-21

